Firms jointly sell durable primary hardware and complementary software in many industries, but it remains unclear how they can coordinate the two products to conduct intertemporal price discrimination (IPD). In addition to the harvesting (i.e., pricecutting over time) incentive in the traditional single-product IPD literature, firms selling complementary products have another investing (i.e., price-raising over time) incentive to penetrate the market early and earn from subsequent complementary product sales.
Introduction
In many industries, especially digital and online businesses, a single firm jointly sells durable primary hardware and complementary software. A typical example is e-readers and e-books. E-reading has been growing rapidly since 2007; by November 2012, 28 percent of all U.S. book purchases were in e-book format (Bowker Market Research, 2012) . In this market, consumers first buy an e-reading device, e-reader, and then buy e-books from the same retailer. 1 Other complementary product examples include consoles and video games, Apple TV and digital content in iTunes, razors and blades, printers and cartridges.
Given the dynamic nature of consumption, firms usually open with high prices for new products to exploit high-valuation consumers and later cut the prices to appeal to lowvaluation consumers. They either conduct this intertemporal price discrimination (IPD for short) separately for hardware and software (e.g., consoles and video games) or only for hardware, keeping the software price stable (e.g., e-books). However, the two products are complementary: (1) consumers need to buy the primary product to consume the complementary product, and (2) the usage intensity of the complementary product drives adoption of the primary product. Is it possible to coordinate the two pricing instruments and generate higher profits?
To address this question, we develop a dynamic structural model of consumer demand and firm pricing to empirically investigate optimal joint IPD strategies in the e-reader and e-book market. There have been studies on dynamic pricing of a single product (e.g., Stokey 1979 Stokey , 1981 ; Besanko and Winston 1990; Nair 2007) and static pricing of complementary products 1 There are three players (publishers, platform retailers, and consumers) and three products (print books, e-books, and e-readers) in the industry. Platform retailers launch their own e-readers and set e-reader prices. Two pricing contracts exist for books. Under the wholesale contract, retailers set book prices and pay wholesale prices to the publishers. Under the agency contract, publishers set book prices and share a fraction of book revenue with the retailers. E-book pricing followed the wholesale contract from 2007 to 2010 and the agency contract from 2010 to 2012. Print book pricing has always followed the traditional wholesale contract. This paper focuses on the pricing of e-readers and e-books under the wholesale contract where retailers set both prices. Discussion with industry practitioners suggests that print book launching and pricing are unaffected by e-book pricing. Thus, we take print book prices as exogenously given from the data.
(e.g., loss-leader strategy, or "metering" strategy, as in Gil and Hartmann 2009 ). Little is known, however, about dynamic pricing of complementary products. In a single-product setting, harvesting (price-cutting over time, skimming) is optimal. When accounting for the complementary product in the e-book and e-reader market, firms have another investing incentive (i.e., price-raising over time, penetration pricing). They can penetrate the market with low initial e-reader prices and earn from subsequent e-book sales. Both harvesting and investing incentives exist for both e-reader and e-book pricing, which leads to various possible price trajectory combinations. On the demand side, forward-looking consumers may anticipate future price changes and intertemporally arbitrage. Firms also need to account for this strategic behavior when setting prices.
We provide a framework to incorporate all these incentives. Using individual-level transaction data from 2008 to 2012, we first estimate a dynamic demand system of consumers buying and upgrading e-readers and buying books. Consumers maximize their direct utility from books by choosing book quantity, reading format (e-books or print books), and retail channel for print books (Amazon.com, other online websites, local bookstores) in a number of book genres. They self-select into buying e-readers based on their unobserved heterogeneous tastes for books. The demand system is estimated without imposing pricing optimality conditions. Using the demand estimates, we numerically solve for the optimal joint IPD strategies given cost information from industry reports. A monopolist retailer maximizes total profits from e-readers, print books, and e-books. Both consumers and the retailer are forward-looking in the pure-strategy Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE).
We find that the optimal joint IPD strategy is to harvest on e-readers and invest in e-books. Conducting IPD on both products benefits the retailer in two ways. First, it offers the retailer a better screening device to induce a higher fraction of avid readers to buy. Second, it limits consumers' ability to intertemporally arbitrage by providing incentives both to delay purchase and to buy earlier. 2 We discuss the profitability of the joint IPD policy by comparing it to a single IPD policy in which, the firm only conducts IPD on e-readers and commits to a fixed e-book price. We find that profitability depends on the composition of heterogeneous consumers in the initial market. The joint IPD policy increases e-reader profits by 24.5% and total profits by $396 million if 30% of consumers are avid readers. If the fraction of avid readers is too low, it is better to commit to a fixed e-book price.
The novelty of the complementary setting is that the retailer can exploit a new dimension of consumer heterogeneity, namely, the relative demand elasticities between the two products.
Our demand estimates reveal two consumer types, "avid readers" and "general readers," with unobserved heterogeneous tastes for books. Traditional single-product IPD exploits the heterogeneity in the demand elasticities across consumer types: avid readers are less price elastic than general readers to both e-readers and e-books. The joint IPD policy further exploits the heterogeneity in the relative demand elasticities between the two products within each consumer type. The key demand-side finding that drives the supply-side pricing policy is that avid readers are more price elastic to e-books than to e-readers and that general readers are more price elastic to e-readers than to e-books. As the e-reading penetration rate of avid readers increases, the optimal pricing policy is to harvest on e-readers and invest in e-books. The opposite is true for general readers. 3 In general, the retailer can use different joint price trajectories (i.e., harvesting on e-readers and investing in e-books, or investing in e-readers and harvesting on e-books) to induce different consumer types to purchase. The joint IPD policy serves as a better screening device for more profitable consumers.
Why do consumers exhibit different relative demand elasticities between the two products? The key intuition is that the usage intensity of the complementary product drives the adoption of the primary product. In general, our results are applicable to other industries that exhibit the same feature. We endogenize the usage intensity (i.e., book purchase) to be a function of heterogeneous consumer tastes and complementary product prices. Avid readers enjoy reading, spend more on books than on e-readers, and care more about subsequent book prices. Meanwhile, they benefit more from adopting e-readers and tend to buy e-readers earlier than others. This self-selection process drives the relative demand elasticities, which in turn drive the pricing policy. To see the importance of modeling this self-selection process, consider two pricing arrangements in a static setting: 1) high e-reader prices and low e-book prices, and 2) low e-reader prices and high e-book prices. A model without self-selection ignores the fact that consumers differ in their consumption of the two products and react to the two pricing arrangements differently. The model would thus predict that the two pricing arrangements (at some price levels) induce the same number of homogeneous adopters and make no difference to the retailer. However, our model with self-selection would predict that the former induces more avid-reader adopters while the latter induces more general-reader adopters. The compositions of adopters under the two scenarios have different pricing implications for the retailer. Similar logic applies to the intertemporal case, once we replace "high price" with harvesting and "low price" with investing. On the demand side, accounting for self-selection also produces more efficient estimates, as the adoption behavior contains information on consumers' heterogeneous tastes.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to empirically study IPD on complementary products. A number of empirical papers have studied optimal IPD strategy for a single durable good (e.g., Hendel and Nevo 2013, Lazarev 2013) . In a complementary product setting, Leung (1997) and Koh (2006) theoretically study durable product IPD in the existence of a flat-rate complementary product. Nair (2007) and Liu (2010) empirically study IPD in the video game and console industry. They focus on single-product IPD and abstract from either software pricing or hardware pricing. We diverge from the extant literature by modeling the dynamic pricing decisions of both products. In particular, we also allow for IPD on the complementary product and for self-selection based on heterogeneous tastes. This enables us to discover new joint IPD strategies that take advantage of the complementarity. In the next section, we describe the data and some stylized facts that motivate the demand model specification. Section 3 presents the dynamic demand model of e-readers and books, and the firm's dynamic pricing problem. Section 4 discusses identification strategies and estimation methods, and presents the estimation results and model fit. The optimal IPD policy and profitability results are in Section 5. Section 6 offers a conclusion.
Data and Industry Background

The U.S. E-Book Industry
The e-book market did not experience rapid growth until Amazon released its first ereader, the Kindle, in 2007. Since then, the market size of e-books has grown from $20 million to $969.9 million in 2011 (Association of American Publishers). Amazon, also a major bookseller of hardcovers and paperbacks, is the dominant player in this market. 4 Its existing relationship with publishers enables it to offer a wide variety of e-books, which it sells at a substantial discount in the Kindle Store. Newly released New York Times bestsellers were sold at $9.99 in the early years of e-reading, a much lower price than the average retail print book price $17.66. Amazon also offered the gateway product to e-reading, Kindle, at affordable prices and increasing qualities over time. By providing various low-priced e-books This paper focuses on the optimal IPD strategies for a monopolist retailer, Amazon.
Consumers buy Kindles and e-books from Amazon, and buy paperbacks from all major retail channels: Amazon.com, other online websites, and offline bookstores. The data used contain prices and sales information for e-readers and books at the individual level, as discussed in the next subsection.
Data Description
We combine three individual-level online transaction data sets. The first data set is the transaction records of consumer online book purchases in years 2008-2012, gathered by comScore. 5 Each purchase record contains the retail website, purchase time, book title, format (paperback or e-book), price, and quantity information. It also includes demographics such as household income, age, family size, zip code, etc. 6 In the five years of the data set, 20,637 households made 72,619 book purchases. Among the online shoppers sampled by comScore, 41% bought at least one book every year. Amazon's market share was 60% on average and increased over time as shown in Figure 1 .
5 The comScore Web Behavior Database captures detailed browsing and buying behaviors of 100,000 Internet users across the United States. The panel is based on a random sample from a cross-section of more than two million global Internet users who have given comScore explicit permissions to confidentially capture their Web-wide activities. It is weighted so that the distribution of the demographics matches that of the U.S. Internet user population. ComScore conducts various validity tests to prove its representativeness. 6 The income and age information is in terms of groups. Consumers are categorized into three income groups and three age groups. Table 1 .
The third data set contains book characteristics that we collected from Amazon using web scrapers. For each book title in the first data set, we collect its genre information and prices for both paperback and e-book formats. There are 122,068 pieces of title-format information. We group the subgenres into three genres -"lifestyle," "casual," and "practical" 7 -and aggregate the book purchase records to form the genre-format-retailer level book quantity choices for each consumer every period in the demand model. We also construct the average prices at genre-format-retailer level using all book titles every period. 8 For 75.2% of the book titles, e-book prices were lower than their paperback prices. A typical paperback cost $17.66, and a typical e-book cost $9.72. "Casual" books were the cheapest and "practical" books were the most expensive. The average prices were stable over time. Second, we obtain the number of e-books available every year in the Kindle Store from a widely cited blog that takes monthly snapshots of Amazon. 10 The number of available e-7 Subgenres within the same genre have similar prices and reading purposes, so consumers' purchasing patterns are much closer within than across genres. We use this coarser categorization in the empirical estimation. The subgenre definition comes from Amazon. 8 The prices used here are historical in the first data set rather than the prices from web scrapers. The sales-weighted and unweighted prices differ by less than 2%. We use the unweighted one in the estimation. See Section 4.2 for more discussion.
9 E-commerce constitutes 25.1%, 35.1%, and 43.8% of the U.S. trade book sales in the years 2010-2012. The rest of the book sales come from offline retailers such as large chain bookstores and independent bookstores. Among book buyers, 44% have purchased books online. bought a particular genre in at most one reading format. For consumers buying e-books, 76.9% of the time they chose the e-format for "lifestyle" books, 96.4% for "casual" books, and 61.6% for "practical" books. "Casual" e-books seem to be the strongest substitute for their paperback counterpart. Finally, e-reading is positively related to "casual" book consumption, suggesting a self-selection process of e-reading based on consumers' genre-specific tastes. 13 
Model Setup and Demand Estimation
In this section, we first illustrate the pricing incentives using a simple two-period model and then describe the full empirical model.
A Simple Two-period Model
Consider a two-period model where a firm sells a durable primary good (Kindle) at price 11 First, according to the industry-wide practice, a typical hardcover list price is $29.95, and its e-book list price is $23.95. The publishers sell the books at a wholesale price, 50% of the list price, to the retailers.
So the paperback wholesale price is $15 and the e-book wholesale price is $12.
Second, we impute the Kindle costs from firms that release teardown reports almost every year (http://www.isuppli.com/Teardowns/News/Pages/Amazon-Kindle-Fire-Costs-$201-70-toManufacture.aspx). For years without these reports, we extrapolate by assuming that the cost drops at the same rate as that of computer parts. 12 The correlation coefficient is 0.03 on average. 13 The demand estimates in Section 4 reveal that the "casual" category has the largest positive e-format fixed effect, while the "practical" category has a negative fixed effect. The e-format fixed effect contributes to the gain in book flow utilities from adopting e-readers. Consumers who like reading "casual" books gain more and are more likely to buy e-readers. Using backward induction to solve for period 2 and period 1 prices, we get
The optimal prices in period 2 are P * 2 = 0 and p
. The optimal prices in period 1
. In particular, P *
and p E * 1 = 0 if λ 1, and P * 1 = 0
and p
The optimal strategies with complementary products differ from the harvesting (pricecutting) strategy of the traditional single-product IPD in two ways. First, both harvesting (price-cutting) and investing (price-raising) can be optimal. If λ 1, it is optimal to harvest on the primary good and invest in the complementary good. The opposite is true for λ < 1.
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Second, the firm should coordinate p E and P . The optimal pricing condition p
indicates that the optimal P increases as p E decreases within the same period. The results we get from the full model echo the results from this simple model.
Consumer Problem
In this subsection, we outline the dynamic demand model of consumer e-reader adoption and upgrading decisions, as well as book purchase decisions. The consumer taste heterogeneity, demand elasticities, and substitution patterns between paperbacks and e-books are critical inputs to the computation of optimal pricing strategies in the next subsection. The time period is one year. Every period, consumers make ex-ante dynamic Kindle adoption decisions, and then make book purchase decisions based on their device-adoption statuses;
they never drop out of the market.
The consumer book consumption is modeled at the genre-format-retailer level instead of book title level. First, firms care about aggregate book sales when pricing rather than the sales of a particular book title. Therefore, we focus on predicting book quantity choices instead of predicting which book title would be popular. 17 Second, we do not have aggregate sales data for the book titles in the sample, which prevent us from estimating title fixed effects and accounting for price endogeneity issues. The benefit of modeling at the genrelevel is that the average genre price is not endogenous to the quality of a particular book title in that genre. Section 4.2 provides more discussion on this.
We make the following assumptions for tractability and data limitation reasons. First, we assume that consumers only read e-books on e-readers and not on other screens, such as PCs and tablets; that is, they need to buy an e-reader before purchasing and reading e-books.
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(low λ). 17 Meanwhile, modeling at the title-level would require strong assumptions on the books that enter consumers' choice set. It is not appealing to assume that consumers consider millions of books available. It is also not appealing to assume that consumers consider bestsellers, as 99.94% of the titles were purchased less than ten times in the data. Even the best-selling book had only 67 purchases out of 72,619 total purchases. Book consumption is much more dispersed than that of movies and video games. 18 Survey results show that e-readers are the dominant device used. Consumers using dedicated e-readers contribute the most to e-book consumption (the Book Industry Study Group survey, 2011). As a robustness Second, we assume that consumers only use one Kindle at a time and that there is no resale value for Kindles. We also assume that Amazon offers one Kindle version per period, which is the most popular version of the Kindle for every period observed in the data.
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Book quantity, format, and paperback retail channel choice Consumers choose current period book quantity and format in three genres: "lifestyle," "casual," and "practical," indexed by g = 1, 2, 3. A Kindle owner can buy both paperbacks and e-books, while a non-owner can only buy paperbacks. If the consumer buys paperbacks, he decides whether to buy from Amazon.com, other online websites, or offline bookstores. Let superscript E and P denote e-books and paperbacks respectively. Let superscript 0 denote Kindle non-owners and 1 denote owners. Let p
and q
denote the prices and quantities of books in paperback/e-book format for non-owners/owners of type i in genre g. The time subscript is dropped for notational simplicity. A Kindle owner of type i maximizes his period utility from books:
where a P ig and a E ig are taste parameters. b i can be interpreted as the price coefficient (discussed later). z is the numeraire and y i is household income. The numeraire price is normalized to check, we allow consumers to buy other reading devices in the demand estimation. The estimated Kindle qualities are affected, while the key demand-side results remain the same. We can also account for reading e-books on other devices by adding the relevant book profits to Amazon's profit function in Section 3.3.
The impact is that Amazon has weaker incentive to set low e-book prices to induce Kindle adoption because some consumers already own other devices. However, the joint IPD strategy is not qualitatively changed. 19 In practice, consumers are offered up to two generations of Kindles every year, except for year 2012, when three generations were on the market. The most popular version comprised at least 70% of the sales every year. Also, multi-product firm pricing is computationally prohibitive. Goettler and Gordon (2011) also make this single-product assumption for computational reasons. 20 Economides, Seim, and Viard (2008) adopt a similar quadratic functional form without allowing for substitution. For a nice survey on direct utility models of consumer choice in marketing, see Chandukala, Kim, Otter, Rossi, and Allenby (2008). be 1. A Kindle non-owner solves a similar problem but without e-book choices:
The optimal quantity choices in each genre for an owner and a non-owner are
We use the quadratic utility functional form, instead of the discrete choice logit utility or the CES utility, because it has the following advantages: 1) it allows for multiple-unit and corner solutions (zero consumption), which are common in book purchase patterns; 2) the optimal quantity is a linear function of the prices, so that b i can be interpreted as the price coefficient. There is perfect substitution between paperbacks and e-books of the same genre. 21 Purchases across genres are independent.
21 Notice that this model specification cannot generate positive numbers of books bought for both formats in the same genre. In the data set, only 1.34% of consumers buy positive quantities of both formats. For these consumers, we assume that there are two shopping occasions in a period. The observation q P , q E is treated as two independent observations q P , 0 and 0, q E . This would mildly overestimate the substitution Once a consumer chooses to buy paperbacks, he decides among buying from Amazon.com, other online websites, and offline bookstores. This paperback retail channel choice does not interact with the previous book quantity and format choice. We parameterize the taste parameters as
where each taste parameter contains a deterministic part and an i.i.d. normally distributed error term η ig with mean zero and standard deviation σ. 24 The two formats in the same genre share the same baseline taste while e-format has extra taste components. In the baseline taste, θ ig is the genre-specific reading taste or the fixed effect for genre g. It is heterogeneous across consumers and is not correlated with observed household demographics.
between paperbacks and e-books. 22 In the data, consumers who choose different retail channels do not have different book consumption patterns. They share the same format substitution pattern and quantity choice pattern. 23 During the data sample period, e-commerce has grown steadily as part of the total retail sales (http://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec_current.pdf). We use a linear time trend to parsimoniously capture it. 24 In a robustness check, we allow η P ig and η E ig to be correlated within the same genre. The implied substitution patterns and price elasticities are very robust with respect to this specification change.
We model it using a finite mixture specification. For the e-format exclusive part, θ E g is the genre-specific fixed effect. n E is the time-varying number of e-books available in the Kindle Store, which is exogenously given from the data. 25 Consumer may value the increasing availability of e-books. Both the baseline taste and e-format taste can vary by age. Senior consumers are in general less tech-savvy and can have different e-format utilities as compared to young consumers. Finally, we allow the price coefficients to vary across income groups
. Recall that the demand function is a ig − b i p g . All the components in the deterministic part of the taste parameter a ig affect demand directly. The price affects the demand through b i . In all, consumers differ in their observed types (captured by D by substituting the optimal book purchase decisions into the utility function and taking expectations over the error terms η ig in a ig .
The number of e-books available is unlikely to be endogenous to the e-reader and e-book pricing in this industry. Publishers decide whether or not to launch the e-book version of the books on a title-by-title basis. These decisions are particularly affected by their perception of e-books as a new reading format. They are concerned about the cannibalization of e-books on print book sales, and change their e-book publishing policies from time to time. In addition, e-book introduction is often not platform-exclusive; publishers will sell e-books on all major e-book retail platforms regardless of their e-reader user base. Amazon.com and Barnesandnoble.com both have around three million e-books available by 2012, but their e-reader userbases differ by five times. This is in contrast to the video game industry where games are often exclusive to a particular platform. If the consumer buys/upgrades the device in the current period, he receives utility
Device adoption decision
If the consumer chooses to wait, he receives utilitȳ
The flow utility from books v 
is allowed to vary across income groups.
The idiosyncratic shocks {ε i , ε i } are identically and independently distributed extreme value 26 As a robustness check, we also try another rational expectation assumption where consumer exceptions follow an AR(1) process. The coefficients in the AR(1) model are empirically estimated using the observed prices and characteristics. The results are robust to different consumer expectation assumptions. The estimated variance of the error terms in the AR(1) model are small, indicating a small difference between the rational expectation assumption and the perfect foresight assumption.
27 As a validation of this assumption, Kindle prices experienced a significant drop in 2007-2011 and have remained in the $139-$199 range since 2011.
28 The flow utility from books does not vary by Kindle versions. As a robustness check, we estimate a model where the fixed effects of different Kindle versions enter the flow utility from books. The estimated fixed effects are not significant. This is because consumers with different Kindle versions do not exhibit different e-book consumption patterns in the data. For instance, Kindle owners in 2012 did not buy significantly different numbers of e-books per person compared to Kindle owners in 2008, although they had newer Kindle versions. Thus, we keep the original model specification.
type I errors, which are also independent of the error terms on the book side. The variances are normalized to be 1.
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Next we describe the dynamic problem. The type subscript i and time subscript t are dropped for notational simplicity. Let prime denote the next period value. For each type of consumer, the state space contains (1) whether the consumer has a Kindle, and if so, the device he ownsQ; (2) the e-book price p E , which enters the ex-ante flow utility from books v book ; 30 (3) the offered Kindle price P and quality Q; (4) the idiosyncratic shocks on the device side ε ≡ {ε, ε}. Let V Q , Q, P, p E , ε denote the value function of a consumer with current deviceQ at the beginning of the period. d = 1 indicates buying/upgrading and
The first and second elements of the max operator are the choice-specific value functions of waiting and buying/upgrading. Conditional on waiting, the device adoption status remains atQ. Conditional on buying/upgrading, the device adoption status evolves deterministically fromQ to Q. The rest of the state space Q, P, p 
29 Another normalization approach is to drop the coefficient Γ and estimate the variance of the error term. The two approaches are equivalent. The coefficient Γ is thus identified by the observed variation in the Kindle adoption decisions, similar to how variance of the error term is identified in the second normalization approach.
30 Paperback prices p P and e-book varieties n E also enter v. They are taken as exogenous from the data.
We need to solve the consumers' and the firm's dynamic problems jointly in equilibrium.
It is useful to rewrite the above equation as a function of the firm's state space ∆, which is a vector that contains the number of Kindle non-owners for each type at the beginning of the current period (similar to v * 1 in the simple two-period model). In equilibrium, the Kindle price P = P (∆) and the e-book price p E = p E (∆) are functions of the state space. 31 We can equivalently rewrite the consumer's problem with ∆ in the state space instead of P and
Notice that there is a unique expected value function for each type in each period. The probability of buying/upgrading is
Given the consumer adoption probability φ, the state space evolves deterministically as
The key feature of the demand system is that Kindle adoption is driven by usage intensity of books. The usage intensity is further endogenized to be a function of consumers' book tastes and book prices. In this sense, e-book prices affect Kindle attractiveness. The bookside and device-side decisions are linked because: (1) the ex-ante flow utilities from book 31 Consumer's problem is a function of ∆ because ∆ enters the firm's pricing policy, which in turn enters consumer's problem. We assume that consumers observe it "merely as a convenient way to impose rational expectations over future prices" (Goettler and Gordon 2011).
purchase affect the Kindle adoption decisions; (2) the Kindle adoption statuses influence the book formats from which consumers can choose. Consumers are motivated to buy Kindles for three reasons: gain from current-period book utility, current device prices and qualities, and the option value of device adoption. To see this, take the difference of the two choice-specific value functions:
The first term represents the increase in flow utility from an enlarged book format choice set
. For an upgrader, it represents the benefit from the higher Kindle quality. The second term indicates that consumers will respond to a Kindle price drop. The third term is the option value, or the discounted utility gain from Kindles in the future. Both the current and future gains drive consumers to self-select into buying Kindles. We can expect that consumers who like reading benefit more from having Kindles and will adopt earlier.
Firm Problem
In this subsection, we describe the firm's optimal Kindle and e-book pricing problem. To keep the model tractable, we make several simplifications from the demand model. Third, we restrict the pricing policy to be functions of only the two unobserved types and average over the observed types (demographics). This helps reduce the state space greatly from 36 dimensions to two dimensions, while keeping the major heterogeneity in consumer 32 The upgraders are modeled in a simplified way. They have proportionally higher book flow utilities than first-time adopters. The proportion is calculated from the average value in the demand system. tastes that drives self-selection.
The firm sets Kindle price P and e-book price p E to maximize total discounted profits from Kindles, print books, and e-books. The demand system provides two key inputs to the firm's pricing problem: (a) the probability of adopting Kindles for each consumer type φ; (b) 
dynamic future state change = 0
We consider the pure-strategy Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) where both consumers and the firm are forward-looking. The non-commitment pricing policy is subgame perfect in that prices are optimal given the state of the market in any period. 33 The setup is similar to the framework in Nair (2007) and Goettler and Gordon (2011) . The equilibrium requires that the consumer's expectation over future state is consistent with the firm's optimal strategy. 34 The equilibrium is defined as the set V * , W * , P * , p E * , ∆ * , which includes the equilibrium value functions for the consumers and the firm, the optimal pricing policy functions for both Kindles and e-books, and the beliefs about next period state space.
Demand Estimation and Supply Simulation Method
This section constructs the likelihood function based on the demand model, and discusses identification and estimation strategies. We then present the model fit, discuss the parameter 33 We consider non-commitment policies because "policies with commitment are not generally subgame perfect" and "the firm has an incentive to deviate from the announced policy after the initial period passes" (Besanko and Winston (1990) . Non-commitment policies, in contrast, are "more managerially relevant" (Nair 2007) .
34 Consumer rational expectation assumption is common in dynamic equilibrium models. On the theoretical side, such "relatively simple equilibrium policies are effective in explaining the key qualitative features of the data" (Nair 2007 ). In practice, price drops of digital durable goods such as iPhones occur in a regular manner. Many online websites (decide.com) also provide consumers with price drop predictions based on historical price data, which further enhances consumers' ability to predict price change.
estimates, and provide implications of the demand estimates.
Likelihood Function
The total log likelihood is comprised of probabilities for the individual-level device and book choice observations, as well as aggregate offline book sales L = L Kindle +L book +L aggregate .
On the device side, for each consumer type, solving the dynamic programming problem gives the conditional probability of buying/upgrading conditional on holding Kindle versionQ. It is φ d = 1 |Q, Q, P or φ d = 1 |Q, t , as {P, Q} are unique per period.
The conditional probability of buying/upgrading further imply the probabilities of holding a particular generation of Kindle at each point in time Pr Q | t . Combining these two probabilities, we can calculate the unconditional probabilities of buying/upgrading every period
The device part of the log likelihood function
for each consumer type is
where n 1t is the Kindle sales at time t and n 0t = N 0 − n 1t . N 0 is the initial number of consumers in the market. Summing over the observed types and integrating over the unobserved types, we get the total device-side log likelihood function. Notice that calculating the device choice probability involves calculating the indirect utilities from books v , the truncation point is a result of a max operator. We use Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 10 nodes to calculate the conditional expectations. The details are presented in the appendix.
On the book side, the individual-level probabilities of book quantity, format, and paperback retail channel choices are combined to form the likelihood L book . For instance, a Kindle owner i buys q paperbacks from Amazon and zero e-book in genre g. The probability of this observation is
The paperback retail channel choice probability is a standard discrete choice logit probability.
The quantity-format choice probability is calculated based on the optimal quantity solution
In particular, we need the probability for q =ā 
Identification
The book-side taste parameters and price coefficients are identified by the heterogeneity of consumer book consumptions in a standard way. In particular, the price coefficient is identified from the variation in book prices across genres, reading formats and over time, although the intertemporal variation is much smaller than the cross-sectional variation. The substitution patterns between paperbacks and e-books pin down the e-format exclusive util-35 For instance, a Kindle non-owner buysq ig = max ā
. Error terms for each individual are simulated for 10,000 times. The set of simulated error terms is fixed throughout the estimation to keep the problem stationary.
ities for each book genre. On the device side, given the same Kindle offered in each period, the Kindle sales among different types of consumers identify the coefficient on the flow utility from books. Two sources identify the qualities (captured by a log time trend): (1) cross-sectionally, the different adoption/upgrading probabilities of consumers owning different Kindle versions; (2) intertemporally, the adoption/upgrading probabilities of different consumer types. Several parameters are identified from both sides, as Kindle adoption is a self-selection process that reveals information about consumers' book reading tastes. For instance, the income-specific price coefficients and age-specific taste coefficients are identified both by the observed book purchases and the observed Kindle adoption patterns across income-age groups.
Upgrading can be identified from the link between book consumption and Kindle purchase. In a world without upgrading, Kindle sales and penetration rates would be one-to-one. Extra Kindle sales directly lead to extra e-book sales. Upgrading is identified if the Kindle sales in later years do not lead to a proportional increase in e-book sales. Furthermore, the demographics of Kindle buyers over time offer clues about returning consumers. The early adopters of Kindles in the data are more likely to be older and have higher income.
Without upgrading, the change in the demographic composition should be monotonic as the consumer pool is exhausted. Upgraders can be identified if the income and age distribution of the Kindle adopters in the later years is similar to that in the early years.
Price endogeneity
The demand estimation is conducted without imposing pricing optimality conditions. The model setup helps eliminate the price endogeneity issue. First, to account for the fact that Kindle prices might be endogenous to their qualities, we explicitly model and estimate the qualities of different Kindle generations. Second, we model book consumption at the genre level instead of at the book-title level. The price of a particular book title might be endogenous to its quality, which in turn affects its sales. We use the average price of a particular genre in the model, which is not endogenous to the qualities of individual book titles in that genre. In other words, a single book title does not drive the average genre price. 36 The genre qualities are estimated as fixed effects in the model.
To ensure that bestsellers do not drive average genre price in the data, we first tabulate the sales of the book titles in our data. It turns out that 92.82% of the book titles have only one purchase record, 5.53% have two purchases, and 99.94% have less than 10 purchases.
This pattern holds for all genres and reading formats. The title with highest sales was bought 67 times among 72,619 total book transactions. In general, book consumption is much more dispersed than, for instance, video games. We conduct robustness checks by estimating the model using both sales-weighted and unweighted prices. 37 The results are quite robust. The sales-weighted and unweighted prices only differ by 2% on average across genres and reading formats, and one of them is not systematically higher or lower than the other.
Estimation and Simulation Methods
To estimate the demand model, we use the Nested Fixed Point algorithm (NFXP) proposed
by Rust (1987) . For each iteration, we solve the dynamic programming problem for each consumer type in the inner loop and use MLE in the outer loop. Given a set of parameter guesses, we first calculate the book-side probabilities and the flow utilities from books. We then feed the flow utilities to the device side and solve the dynamic programming problem using the value function iteration method. The flow utilities and expected value functions are calculated separately for the 36 consumer types (3 age group * 3 income group * 4 unobserved segments on book tastes) every period. In particular, the value functions need to be calculated for consumers holding different generations of Kindles. Given the value functions,
we can construct the device-side probabilities and form the total likelihood function.
To solve for the supply-side pricing problem, we solve in an inner loop the firm's and the consumer's maximization problem and calculate the next period states. In particular, the pricing policies and the next period states need to be consistent as a fixed point. Given the 36 In fact, a single book title is also unlikely to drive consumer choices such as Kindle purchase. We can compare the book market to the video game market. First, consumers can always buy a title in paperback format, while they cannot play games without buying the console. Second, e-books are not exclusive to retail platforms. Amazon and Barnesandnoble.com have comparable number of e-books available, while many video games are exclusive to particular consoles.
37 Thanks to Song Yao for suggesting this robustness check. Function approximations are used in the supply-side simulation. First, two demandside variables enter the supply-side problem: the probability of adopting Kindles φ and the book profits generated per Kindle owner r 1 and non-owner r 0 . They are calculated from consumer book demand and indirect book flow utilities, which are functions of Kindle price P and e-book price p E . We evaluate them on a set of grid points for P and p E given the estimated demand system. We then approximate these variables as functions of P and p E using splines. 38 Second, we discretize the state space into 20 grid points along each dimension. The value functions are approximated using cubic splines by interpolating between grid points. This gives us differentiable functions to solve the firm's first-orderconditions. Table 1 presents the observed and predicted Kindle penetration rates over time. Figure 1 compares the observed and predicted book sales for both paperbacks and e-books by book genre and by retail channel over time. The demand model is estimated using data in 2008-2012. Data in 2013 are used as an out-of-sample fit test. The model fits the level and the 38 We try both linear splines and cubic splines. It turns out that linear splines with 11 breakpoints provide better approximation. First, the functions are highly linear with little local curvatures. Second, the values of the functions level off as P and p E increase. Cubic splines produce small fluctuations around the steady value, which makes the derivatives inaccurate. The accuracy of the derivatives is important in the supply-side problem when solving for the firm's first-order-conditions. Therefore, we use linear splines to approximate the functions. 
Model Fit
Parameter Estimates
Parameter interpretations Table 2 reports the parameter estimates. The results show that consumers are highly heterogeneous in their unobserved genre-specific reading tastes, which are captured by a finite mixture structure. 39 The data reveal four segments. Segments 39 We determine the number of segments by incrementally adding segments until one of the segment sizes is not statistically different from zero. Besanko, Dube, and Gupta (2003) and Nair (2007) have taken a similar In terms of reading format choice, we find that consumer format preferences vary across book genre. Consumers enjoy extra utilities from reading "lifestyle" and "casual" books in eformat and face disutilities from reading "practical" books in e-format. We can express these utilities in terms of numbers of books. If there were no price differences between the two formats, the same consumer would buy 0.70 more "lifestyle" books, 2.76 more "casual" books, and 1.37 fewer "practical" books in e-format as compared to his paperback consumption.
The different e-format utilities also result in different substitution patterns between paperbacks and e-books. We find that "casual" e-books have a lower own-elasticity and a higher cross-elasticity with respect to paperbacks, indicating that they are stronger substitutes for paperbacks. For other coefficient estimates, we do not find statistically significant evidence that older people dislike the e-format or that e-book variety affects e-format attractiveness, although the two coefficients have expected signs.
Finally, the paperback retail channel estimates show that book buyers are migrating from offline to online, and from other online websites to Amazon.com. One interesting finding is that once consumers adopt Kindles, they not only buy e-books from Amazon, but also prefer buying paperbacks from Amazon. In 2012, for instance, a Kindle owner had 61.1%
probability of buying paperbacks from Amazon conditional on buying, while the probability was 47.6% for a Kindle non-owner.
approach. Consumer heterogeneity Consumers are highly heterogeneous in their book and Kindle consumption. We find that although avid readers have lower price elasticities for both
Kindles and e-books than general readers, they are relatively more sensitive to e-book prices.
Meanwhile, general readers are more sensitive to Kindle prices. 40 This is the key finding that drives the optimal pricing policy in the next section. The intuition is that, as compared to general readers, avid readers spend more on books than on devices and care more about subsequent book purchases when considering buying Kindles. Notice that the differences are all driven by the differences in their unobserved reading tastes. Table 3 
Supply-side Policy Simulations
Given the estimated demand system, we examine Amazon's optimal IPD policies and profitability with complementary products. Since the demand system is estimated without imposing supply-side optimality conditions, we can make normative predictions for optimal pricing. Nair (2007) and Liu (2010) take a similar approach. We begin by discussing how the existence of the complementary product affects the IPD of the primary product. We hold the complementary product price flat and solve for the optimal IPD strategy for the primary product only. This is comparable to the traditional single-product IPD case and helps illustrate the novelty of the complementary product setting. We then allow the firm to conduct IPD on both the primary and the complementary products. We show that the firm can benefit from a joint IPD policy that exploits a new dimension of consumer heterogeneity.
We make one clarification here on the definition of harvesting and investing. In practice, cost may drop over time and drive down prices. To avoid confusion, we define harvesting and investing based on the mark-up. Firms adopt a harvesting (investing) strategy if the mark-up decreases (increases) over time. Notice that prices can also drop when firms adopt an investing strategy because costs drop faster than prices.
IPD on the primary product only
In this subsection, we solve for the optimal IPD policy on the primary product, holding the complementary product price exogenously fixed and flat. Compared to the traditional IPD literature, some results are consistent and some are novel in this setting. In particular, the firm loses more from consumers' strategic behaviors, although complementarity can enhance the firm's IPD ability on the primary product.
First, complementarity provides extra investing incentives to the firm. The optimal pricing policy is investing rather than harvesting as in the traditional IPD literature. Given the observed e-book price $9.72, the optimal Kindle price drops from $371 in 2008 to $249 in 2012. 41 The markup increases from $135 to $160, suggesting an investing strategy. The incentive to penetrate the market early outweighs the incentive to skim high-valuation consumers.
Second, complementarity influences the firm's IPD ability on the primary product by changing the demand elasticities of the primary product. In particular, a lower e-book price increases the difference in the demand elasticities of Kindles between the two consumer types.
This enhances the firm's IPD ability so that the firm can invest less in Kindles. When the e-book price decreases from $9.94 to $9.63, the optimal Kindle price path shifts up and the average price increases from $292 to $305.
Third, it is noteworthy that the profit loss from consumers' forward-looking behavior is 
IPD on both the primary and the complementary products
In this subsection, we solve for the optimal joint IPD policies on both products (hereon, the joint IPD case). 41 The predicted Kindle and e-book price levels are comparable to the observed prices during the period when Amazon was able to set both Kindle and e-book prices (2008) (2009) (2010) .
We find that the shapes of the optimal pricing functions differ as the penetration rates of different consumer types change. This result is driven by the heterogeneous relative demand elasticities of Kindles and e-books within each consumer type, which is novel in the complementary product setting. Optimal policies are functions of the penetration rates of consumer types. As the penetration rate of avid readers increases, the optimal strategy is to harvest on Kindles and invest in e-books. The opposite is true for general readers.
42 In Figure   2 , we plot the policy functions over the type-specific penetration rates. For a particular penetration rate of avid readers, we average over the optimal prices for all penetration rates of general readers. The optimal Kindle and e-book prices exhibit opposite patterns for avid and general readers. In general, it is optimal to invest in the product with higher relative demand elasticities and harvest on the product with lower relative demand elasticities.
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Avid readers are more price sensitive to e-books than to Kindles. The opposite is true for general readers. The joint IPD policy exploits this new dimension of consumer heterogeneity.
The overall price path trades-off both consumer types and depends on the mix of consumer types in the market.
We use the optimal pricing functions to get predicted price trajectories and compare the results to the scenario where the firm conducts IPD only on Kindles and optimally commits to a fixed e-book price (hereon, the single IPD case). 44 The predicted price trajectory is investing in Kindles in the single IPD case. It is harvesting on Kindles and investing in e-books in the joint IPD case. We present the predicted market outcomes in Table 4 under specification (i). The joint IPD policy induces faster-declining Kindle prices and lower Notes: The graphs come from collapsing the 2-D policy functions. To obtain the optimal prices given a particular penetration rate of the focal type, we average over the optimal prices for all penetration rates of the other type.
penetration rates of both avid readers and general readers.
The joint IPD policy, as compared to the single IPD policy, benefits the firm in two ways. First, it offers the firm a better screening device. The firm can use different price path combinations (e.g., harvesting on Kindles and investing in e-books, or investing in Kindles and harvesting on e-books) to induce different consumer types to purchase. Figure 3 plots the percentage of avid readers among Kindle new adopters over time. The joint IPD policy induces a higher fraction of avid readers, especially in the early stage. This is because the overall optimal pricing is qualitatively the same as the optimal strategy for avid readers.
Avid readers respond the most to this strategy. This echoes the importance of modeling self-selection based on consumer heterogeneity.
Second, the joint IPD policy limits consumers' strategic behaviors by providing conflicting incentives to arbitrage on price changes over time. Instead of delaying purchase as in the traditional literature, consumers adopt Kindles earlier even at higher Kindle prices. The firm not only extracts more Kindle profits, but also earns more book profits from subsequent book sales. Figure 4 plots the Kindle sales by consumer type over time under the single IPD case In the joint IPD case, consumers have two conflicting incentives: they should delay purchase, given price-cutting on Kindles, but should adopt earlier, given price-raising on e-books. This limits their ability to intertemporally arbitrage.
The two mechanisms discussed above contribute to the profitability of jointly conducting IPD on Kindles and e-books. However, profitability is not guaranteed. Given that consumers will arbitrage on price changes, it might be better to commit to a fixed price. This is also true in the traditional single-product IPD. We find that profitability of joint IPD increases when there are more avid readers. If the fraction of avid readers is too low, it is better to commit to a fixed e-book price. Table 4 compares the scenario in which the share of avid readers in the initial market is at the estimated level 13% (specification i) to the scenario in which the share is 30% (specification ii). Committing to a fixed e-book price is better under the current market composition because, using the joint IPD policy, the firm can harvest avid readers using high Kindle prices while keeping Kindles attractive using low e-book prices.
Yet low e-book prices cannot effectively keep general readers, who are less price sensitive to books; high Kindle prices substantially discourage them from adopting. The firm needs a large enough share of avid readers in the initial market to induce profitability. 45 If the fraction of avid readers is 30%, Amazon will benefit substantially from the joint IPD policy.
In particular, Kindle profits increase by 24.5%. Given that the observed Kindle ecosystem produced $12.6 billion in revenue over these years, 46 the total profit gain is $396 million.
Discussion: Optimality and Reality
In this subsection, we compare Amazon's observed pricing strategy to our proposed optimal policy.
The observed Amazon strategy is to conduct IPD only on Kindles and not on books. Our results imply that whether Amazon should conduct IPD only on Kindles or on both products depends on consumer composition in the initial market. Given the estimated fraction of avid readers in the market, it is indeed optimal to conduct IPD only on Kindles. The only difference is that Amazon adopts a harvesting strategy on Kindles, while we propose an investing strategy. In other words, Amazon is cutting Kindle prices faster over time than what the optimal policy suggests. There are two reasons. First, in 2010, e-book pricing contract between Amazon and the major U.S. publishers switched from a wholesale contract 45 Another reason is that the degree of harvesting/investing depends on the mix of consumer types. If the fraction of general readers is too high, the firm would adjust the price level to accommodate general readers, resulting in a deviation from the optimal pricing strategy to avid readers.
46 http://allthingsd.com/20130812/amazon-to-sell-4-5-billion-worth-of-kindles-this-year-morgan-stanleysays/ to an agency contract, which drove down Kindle prices. Our optimal pricing strategy is calculated under the wholesale contract and does not account for the contract switch.
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Second, the presence of competitors after 2010 also drove down prices. Our paper provides a basic framework for understanding a firm's hardware and software pricing coordination incentives, and can be used to explore competitive settings in the future.
Our results also shed light on the pricing incentives behind Amazon's reputation for "pricing-at-cost" for Kindles and e-books. We are able to produce a similar strategy (pricingat-cost for Kindles, and pricing-below-cost for e-books) using our model. We find that Amazon chooses this strategy because of business spillover effects from e-reading-related consumption. First, there is a spillover effect to the book business, such that once consumers adopt Kindles, they not only buy e-books from Amazon, but also prefer buying paperbacks from Amazon. In 2012, for instance, a Kindle owner had 61.1% probability of buying paperbacks from Amazon conditional on buying, while the probability was 47.6% for a Kindle non-owner. Second, there is a spillover effect to other product categories. The Kindle ecosystem comprised 10% of Amazon's total profits in 2011. To rationalize Amazon's sale of e-books at a significant loss, we allow for a spillover effect per book transaction to other product categories on Amazon. 47 Our model can be extended to accommodate the agency contract by modifying the objective function of the firm. The primary difference between the two contracts is who sets e-book prices. Under the wholesale contract, Amazon sets e-book prices for consumers. Under the agency contract, publishers set e-book prices for consumers. We modify our pricing problem to calculate optimal strategies under the agency contract. Our results indicate that the optimal Kindle prices are about $80 lower under the agency contract, which is comparable to the observed Kindle prices in the agency contract period (2010) (2011) (2012) . 48 We keep the spillover effect throughout the pricing problem in the previous sections. The reported book profits also contain this effect, which helps make the quantitative model predictions on profits more realistic without changing the qualitative results on IPD. Gentzkow (2007) adopts a similar approach when rationalizing the zero price of online newspapers. 49 To validate this number, notice that Kindles with no ads are $30 more expensive than those with ads. A typical Kindle owner buys 2.2 more books than a non-owner and produces $16.6 spillover based on our prediction. Kindle ad revenue is comparable to two-year spillover effects. We also check the IPD results with $5 or $6 spillover effects. The results are robust.
50 http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/digital/devices/article/50601-the-kindle-
Conclusion
The paper proposes a novel joint IPD strategy under complementary product setting. Coordinating the pricing of the two products can help the firm better screen consumers based on their heterogeneity in the relative demand elasticities of the two products. It also limits consumer's ability to intertemporally arbitrage. Our study provides new insights into the traditional pricing approach for books. Traditional book prices are set at standard discounts off list prices and remain flat over time. 51 We find that retailers can conduct IPD on e-books to improve profitability, especially given that e-book prices are easily adjustable due to their digital nature.
The optimal pricing strategies and profitability results can be applied to other industries, including consoles and video games, Apple TV and digital content on iTunes, razors and blades, printers and cartridges, K-cups and espresso machines, and so on. The key common feature is that the usage intensity of the complementary product drives the adoption of the primary product. This will drive the heterogeneity in the relative demand elasticities between the primary and complementary products, based on which the joint IPD policy is built. One needs to estimate the relative demand elasticities for different consumer types and the consumer mix. The overall price trajectory and profitability depend on the mix of consumer types.
One possible avenue for future research would be to model innovation and quality choices in addition to pricing. These factors may become more important as the e-reader market matures, as the majority of sales would come from upgrading. Another avenue would be to study competition among retail platforms. In practice, Amazon and Barnes & Noble sell their own e-readers and compete for device and book buyers. The monopoly model in this paper illustrates the fundamental trade-offs for further competitive analysis. It is challenging multiplier.html 51 The same content is priced again only when new book editions are released. For instance, publishers typically first release hardcover editions at higher prices and later release paperback and mass-market paperback editions at lower prices.
to solve for a dynamic competition model with both e-readers and e-books, yet the multiproduct setting can lead to potentially interesting competition patterns. We hope to explore this competitive setting in the future.
Define the thresholds of worth buying asη P ig ≡ bp P g −ā P ig andη E ig ≡ bp E g −ā E ig . To simplify the notation, we drop i and g subscripts for now.
Case 1: A Kindle non-owner. The optimal quantity choice requires that the normally distributed error terms satisfy
The probability of buying q P > 0 number of books is f η P = η q P | η P >η P Pr
. The probability of buying q P = 0 is Pr η P <η P = Φ η P σ
. Here φ (·) and Φ (·)
are pdf and cdf of the normal distribution. So the contribution to the likelihood function for a non-Kindle owner is l non−owner = g 1 q P g > 0
Case 2: A Kindle owner. Similarly, the optimal quantity choice requires that the error terms satisfy
Intuitively, paperbacks are chosen because they are worth buying (η P ig >η P ig ) and they are better than e-books (η P ig > η E ig + η P ig −η E ig ), vise versa. The probability that q P = 0, q E = 0 is Pr ({0, 0}) = Pr η P <η P Pr η E <η E . The probability that q P > 0, q E = 0 is Pr q P , 0 = f η P = η q P | η P > max η P , η E + η P −η E · Pr η P > max η P , v E + η P −η E . Similar for the probability Pr 0, q E . The last two probabilities are conditional probabilities of a truncated normal where the truncation point is a result of a maximization operator. We use the quadrature method to calculate it. The details are presented in the next appendix section.
B. Probability and Indirect Utility Calculation
The taste parameters are parameterized as a T ig =ā T ig + η T ig for T = P, E. Define the realized error terms given the quantity choices as η q P ig ≡ q P ig + bp P g −ā P ig and η q E ig ≡ q E ig + bp E g −ā E ig . Define the thresholds of worth buying asη P ig ≡ bp P g −ā P ig andη E ig ≡ bp E g −ā E ig . The consumer type subscript i and book category subscript g are dropped for notational simplicity.
Probability Calculation We need to calculate Pr q P , 0 , or the following density:
where η P and η E are i.i.d. normally distributed error terms with mean 0 and variance σ 2 .η P , andη E are known deterministic parts. Define Λ ≡ η P −η E to simplify the discussions below. It is easier to start with calculating the CDF instead of the PDF: Pr η P η q P | η P > max η P , η E + ∆ · Pr η P > max η P , η E + Λ . Define η P η q P as event A, η P >η P as event B, η P > η E + Λ as event C, andη P > η E + Λ as event D. Then the CDF can be written as Pr (A | B ∩ C) Pr (B ∩ C).
Notice that event B ∩ D implies event C, and event C ∩ ¬D implies event B. Event B and event D are independent. Taking into account the fact that book quantities are integers, the ultimate probability to calculate is Pr η q P η P < η q P + 1 | η P > max η P , η E + Λ · Pr η P > max η P , η E + Λ = CDF η q P + 1 − CDF η q where the probability Pr η P ig > max η P ig , η E ig + η P ig −η E ig is already calculated in appendix The conditional density f (x | H) is calculated in the last section. Given the conditional density, we calculate the conditional expectations using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 10 nodes.
C. Computation Algorithm for the Dynamic Pricing Problem
The numerical algorithm is similar to that in Goettler and Gordon (2011) . It contains an inner loop and an outer loop. The inner loop solves the firm and consumer maximization problem along with the next period state space given the value function guess. The outer loop updates the value function guess and iterates until convergence.
For the agency model where only the Kindle optimal prices are solved, for each iteration k = 1, 2, ..., 1) Guess the value functions for the firm and the consumers V k−1 , W k−1 .
2) Given the value function guess, simultaneously solve the firm's first-order conditions at each state. Since the first-order conditions depend on consumers' current choices and next period ∆ , which in turn depend on their rational expectations of ∆ , we solve for a fixed point in ∆ such that consumers' expectations for ∆ are realized according to the state space evolution equation . In particular, to solve for the fixed point, first guess the next period state space ∆ m−1 and the firm's optimal pricing policy P m−1 , where m is the iteration number for the fixed point of the inner loop. Given the guess, solve the consumers' device adoption problem to get updated next period state space ∆ m . Given the updated ∆ m , solve the firm's first-order conditions at each state and get the updated optimal pricing policy P m . Check convergence of | ∆ m − ∆ m−1 | and | P m − P m−1 |. If converged, let ∆ k and P k denote this fixed point. This is the solution to the inner loop given the value function guess V k−1 , W k−1 .
3) Update the value functions given the firm's policy and the next period state space. Denote them V k , W k .
4) Check for convergence of the outer loop | V k − V k−1 | and | W k − W k−1 | at the state space grid points ∆. If convergence is not achieved, return to step 1.
The pricing problem for the wholesale model is similar except that an extra first-order condition for e-book pricing is simultaneously solved along with the one for Kindle pricing. The optimal pricing policy for e-book is also updated and converged in the inner loop. Throughout the computation, we discretize the state space evenly into 20 grid points on both dimensions. The range of the state space is between 0 and the initial market size of each type. We use a cubic spline to interpolate between the grid points for the value functions and policy functions. This is because solving the firm's first-order condition requires differentiable continuation values. The convergence is checked at the grid points.
